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RFC1503 - Algorithms for Automating Administration in SNMPv2 Managers

dn001

  Network Working Group K. McCloghrie
Request for Comments: 1503 Hughes LAN Systems
M. Rose
Dover Beach Consulting, Inc.
August 1993

Algorithms for Automating Administration
in SNMPv2 Managers

Status of this Memo

This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard. Distribution of this memo is
unlimited.

Table of Contents

1. IntrodUCtion .......................................... 1
2. Implementation Model .................................. 1
3. Configuration Assumptions ............................. 3
4. Normal Operations ..................................... 4
4.1 Getting a Context Handle ............................. 4
4.2 Requesting an Operation .............................. 7
5. Determining and Using Maintenance Knowledge ........... 8
5.1 Determination of Synchronization Knowledge ........... 9
5.2 Use of Clock Synchronization Knowledge ............... 10
5.3 Determination of Secret Update Knowledge ............. 11
5.4 Use of Secret Update Knowledge ....................... 13
6. Other Kinds and Uses of Maintenance Knowledge ......... 13
7. Security Considerations ............................... 13
8. Acknowledgements ...................................... 13
9. References ............................................ 14
10. Authors' Addresses ................................... 14

1. Introduction

When a user invokes an SNMPv2 [1] management application, it may be
desirable for the user to specify the minimum amount of information
necessary to establish and maintain SNMPv2 communications. This memo
suggests an approach to achieve this goal.

2. Implementation Model

In order to discuss the approach outlined in this memo, it is useful
to have a model of how the various parts of an SNMPv2 manager fit
together. The model assumed in this memo is depicted in Figure 2.1.
This model is, of course, merely for eXPository purposes, and the

approach should be readily adaptable to other models.

(Human) User
*
*
===========User Interface (UI)===========
*
+--------------------------+
... Management Application N
+---------------------------+
Management Application 2 -----+
+--------------------------+ *
Management Application 1 ----+ *
+--------------------------+ * *
* * *
========Management API======================
* *
* ________ *
+-------------+ / Local +---------------+
Context ***/ Party *** SNMP protocol
Resolver(s) Database / engine(s)
+-------------+ ________/ +---------------+
*
*
===========Transport APIs============
*
+---------------------------------+
Transport Stacks (e.g., UDP/IP)
+---------------------------------+
*
Network(s)

Figure 2.1 SNMPv2 Manager Implementation Model

Note that there might be just one SNMP protocol engine and one
"context resolver" which are Accessed by all local management
applications, or, each management application might have its own SNMP
protocol engine and its own "context resolver", all of which have
shared access to the local party database [2].

In addition to the elements shown in the figure, there would need to
be an interface for the administrator to access the local party
database, e.g., for configuring initial information, including
secrets. There might also be facilities for different users to have
different access privileges, and/or other reasons for there to be
multiple (coordinated) subsets of the local party database.

3. Configuration Assumptions

Now, let's assume that the administrator has already configured a
local party database for the management application, e.g.,

partyIdentifier: initialPartyId.a.b.c.d.1
partyIndex: 1
partyTAddress: a.b.c.d:161
partyLocal: false
partyAuthProtocol: noAuth
partyPrivProtocol: noPriv

partyIdentifier: initialPartyId.a.b.c.d.2
partyIndex: 2
partyTAddress: local address
partyLocal: true
partyAuthProtocol: noAuth
partyPrivProtocol: noPriv

partyIdentifier: initialPartyId.a.b.c.d.3
partyIndex: 3
partyTAddress: a.b.c.d:161
partyLocal: false
partyAuthProtocol: md5Auth
partyPrivProtocol: noPriv

partyIdentifier: initialPartyId.a.b.c.d.4
partyIndex: 4
partyTAddress: local address
partyLocal: true
partyAuthProtocol: md5Auth
partyPrivProtocol: noPriv

contextIdentifier: initialContextId.a.b.c.d.1
contextIndex: 1
contextLocal: false
textual handle: router.xyz.com-public

contextIdentifier: initialContextId.a.b.c.d.2
contextIndex: 2
contextLocal: false
textual handle: router.xyz.com-all

aclTarget (dest. party): 1
aclSubject (src party): 2
aclResources (context): 1
aclPrivileges: get, get-next, get-bulk

aclTarget (dest. party): 3
aclSubject (src party): 4
aclResources (context): 2
aclPrivileges: get, get-next, get-bulk, set

Note that each context has associated with it a "textual handle".
This is simply a string chosen by the administrator to aid in
selecting a context.

4. Normal Operations

When the user tells the management application to do something, the
user shouldn't have to specify party or context information.

One approach to achieve this is as follows: the user provides a
textual string indicating the managed objects to be manipulated, and
the management application invokes the "context resolver" to map this
into a "context handle", and later, when an SNMPv2 operation is
performed, the "context handle" and a minimal set of security
requirements are provided to the management API.

4.1. Getting a Context Handle

A "context handle" is created when the management application
supplies a textual string, that was probably given to it by the user.
The "context resolver" performs these steps based on the
application's input:

(1) In the local party database, each context has associated
with it a unique string, termed its "textual handle". If
a context in the local database has a textual handle
which exactly matches the textual string, then the
"context resolver" returns a handle identifying that
context.

So, if the application supplies "router.xyz.com-public",
then the "context resolver" returns a handle to the first
context; instead, if the application supplies
"router.xyz.com-all", then the "context resolver" returns
a handle to the second context.

(2) Otherwise, if any contexts are present whose textual
handle is longer than the textual string, and whose
initial characters exactly match the entire textual
string, then the "context resolver" returns a handle
identifying all of those contexts.

So, if the application supplies "router.xyz.com", then

the "context resolver" returns a handle to both contexts.

(3) Otherwise, if the textual string specifies an IP address
or a domain name which resolves to a single IP address,
then the "context resolver" adds to the local party
database, a volatile noAuth/noPriv party pair, a volatile
context, and a volatile access control entry allowing
interrogation operations, using the "initialPartyId" and
"initialContextId" conventions. The "context resolver"
returns a handle identifying the newly created context.

So, if the application supplies "89.0.0.1", then the
"context resolver" adds the following information to the
local party database:

partyIdentifier: initialPartyId.89.0.0.1.1
partyIndex: 101
partyTAddress: 89.0.0.1:161
partyLocal: false
partyAuthProtocol: noAuth
partyPrivProtocol: noPriv
partyStorageType: volatile

partyIdentifier: initialPartyId.89.0.0.1.2
partyIndex: 102
partyTAddress: local address
partyLocal: true
partyAuthProtocol: noAuth
partyPrivProtocol: noPriv
partyStorageType: volatile

contextIdentifier: initialContextId.89.0.0.1.1
contextIndex: 101
contextLocal: false
contextStorageType: volatile
textual handle: 89.0.0.1

aclTarget (dest. party): 101
aclSubject (src party): 102
aclResources (context): 101
aclPrivileges: get, get-next, get-bulk
aclStorageType: volatile

and the "context resolver" returns a handle to the newly
created context.

(4) Otherwise, if the textual string specifies a domain name
which resolves to multiple IP addresses, then for each

such IP address, the "context resolver" adds to the local
party database, a volatile noAuth/noPriv party pair, a
volatile context, and a volatile access control entry
allowing interrogation operations, using the
"initialPartyId" and "initialContextId" conventions.
Then, the "context resolver" returns a handle identifying
all of those newly created contexts.

(5) Otherwise, if the textual string contains a '/'-
character, and everything to the left of the first
occurrence of this character specifies an IP address or a
domain name which resolves to a single IP address, then
the "context resolver" adds to the local party database,
a volatile SNMPv1 party, a volatile context, and a
volatile access control entry allowing interrogation
operations. (The SNMPv1 community string consists of any
characters following the first occurrence of the '/'-
character in the textual string.) Then, the "context
resolver" returns a handle identifying the newly created
context.

So, if the application supplied "89.0.0.2/public", then
the "context resolver" adds the following information to
the local party database:

partyIdentifier: initialPartyId.89.0.0.2.1
partyIndex: 201
partyTDomain: rfc1157Domain
partyTAddress: 89.0.0.2:161
partyLocal: false
partyAuthProtocol: rfc1157noAuth
partyAuthPrivate: public
partyPrivProtocol: noPriv
partyStorageType: volatile

contextIdentifier: initialContextId.89.0.0.2.1
contextIndex: 201
contextLocal: false
contextStorageType: volatile
textual handle: 89.0.0.2

aclTarget (dest. party): 201
aclSubject (src party): 201
aclResources (context): 201
aclPrivileges: get, get-next, get-bulk
aclStorageType: volatile

and the "context resolver" returns a handle to the the

newly created context.

(6) Otherwise, if the textual string contains a '/'-
character, and everything to the left of the first
occurrence of this character specifies a domain name
which resolves to multiple IP addresses, then for each
such IP address, the "context resolver" adds to the local
party database, a volatile SNMPv1 party, a volatile
context, and a volatile access control entry allowing
interrogation operations. (The SNMPv1 community string
consists of any characters following the first occurrence
of the '/'-character in the textual string.) Then, the
"context resolver" returns a handle identifying all of
those newly created contexts.

(7) Otherwise, an error is raised.

4.2. Requesting an Operation

Later, when an SNMPv2 operation is to be performed, the management
application supplies a "context handle" and a minimal set of security
requirements to the management API:

(1) If the "context handle" refers to a single context, then
all access control entries having that context as its
aclResources, allowing the specified operation, having a
non-local SNMPv2 party as its aclTarget, which satisfies
the privacy requirements, and having a local party as its
aclSubject, which satisfies the authentication
requirements, are identified.

So, if the application wanted to issue a get-next
operation, with no security requirements, and supplied a
"context handle" identifying context #1, then acl #1
would be identified.

(2) For each such access control entry, the one which
minimally meets the security requirements is selected for
use. If no such entry is identified, and authentication
requirements are present, then the operation will be not
performed.

So, if the application requests a get-next operation,
with no security requirements, and supplies a "context
handle" identifying context #1, and step 1 above
identified acl #1, then because acl #1 satisfies the no-
security requirements, the operation would be generated
using acl #1, i.e., using party #1, party #2, and context

#1.

(3) Otherwise, all access control entries having the (single)
context as its aclResources, allowing the specified
operation, and having a non-local SNMPv1 party as its
aclTarget, are identified. If no such entry is
identified, then the operation will not performed.
Otherwise, any of the identified access control entries
may be selected for use.

The effect of separating out step 3 is to prefer SNMPv2
communications over SNMPv1 communications.

(4) If the "context handle" refers to more than one context,
then all access control entries whose aclResources refers
any one of the contexts, are identified. For each such
context, step 2 is performed, and any (e.g., the first)
access control entry identified is selected for use. If
no access control entry is identified, then step 3 is
performed for each such context, and any (e.g., the
first) access control entry identified is selected for
use.

So, if the application wanted to issue a get-bulk
operation, with no security requirements, and supplied a
"context handle" identifying contexts #1 and #2, then
acls #1 and #2 would be identified in step 1; and, in
step 2, party #1, party #2, and context #1 would be
selected.

However, if the application wanted to issue an
authenticated get-bulk operation, and supplied a "context
handle" identifying contexts #1 and #2, then acls #1 and
#2 would still be identified in step 1; but, in step 2,
only acl #2 satisfies the security requirement, and so,
party #3, party #4, and context #2 would be selected.

(5) If no access control entry is identified, then an error
is raised.

Note that for steps 1 and 3, an implementation might choose to pre-
compute (i.e., cache) for each context those access control entries
having that context as its aclResources.

5. Determining and Using Maintenance Knowledge

When using authentication services, two "maintenance" tasks may have
to be performed: clock synchronization and secret update. These

tasks should be performed transparently, independent of the
management applications, and without user/administrator intervention.
In order to operate transparently, the SNMP protocol engine must
maintain "maintenance knowledge" (knowledge of which parties and
contexts to use). It is useful for this maintenance knowledge to be
determined at run-time, rather than being directly configured by an
administrator.

One approach to achieve this is as follows: the first time that the
SNMP protocol engine determines that it will be communicating with
another SNMPv2 entity, the SNMP protocol engine first consults its
local party database and then interrogates its peer, before engaging
in the actual communications.

Note that with such an approach, both the clock synchronization
knowledge, and the secret update knowledge, associated with a party,
can each be represented as (a pointer to) an access control entry.
Further note that once an implementation has computed this knowledge,
it might choose to retain this knowledge across restarts.

5.1. Determination of Synchronization Knowledge

To determine maintenance knowledge for clock synchronization:

(1) The SNMP protocol engine examines each active, non-local,
noAuth party.

So, this would be party #1.

(2) For each such party, P, all access control entries having
that party as its aclTarget, and allowing the get-bulk
operation, are identified.

So, for party #1, this would be acl #1.

(3) For each such access control entry, A, at least one
active, non-local, md5Auth party, Q, must be present
which meets the following criteria:

- the transport domain and address of P and Q are
identical;

- an access control entry, B, exists having either: Q as
its aclTarget and a local party, R, as its aclSubject,
or, Q as its aclSubject and a local party, R, as its
aclTarget; and,

- no clock synchronization knowledge is known for R.

So, for acl #1, party #3 is identified as having the same
transport domain and address as party #1, and being
present as the aclTarget in acl #2, which has local party
#4 as the aclSubject.

(4) Whenever such a party, Q, is present, then all instances
of the "partyAuthProtocol" and "partyAuthClock" objects
are retrieved via the get-bulk operator using the parties
and context identified by the access control entry, A.

So, party #1, party #2, and context #1 would be used to
sweep these two columns on the agent.

(5) Only those instances corresponding to parties in the
local database, which have no clock synchronization
knowledge, and are local mdAuth parties, are examined.

So, only instances corresponding to party #4 are
examined.

(6) For each instance of "partyAuthProtocol", if the
corresponding value does not match the value in the local
database, then a configuration error is signalled, and
the corresponding party is marked as being unavailable
for maintenance knowledge.

So, we make sure that the manager and the agent agree
that party #4 is an md5Auth party.

(7) For each instance of "partyAuthClock", if the
corresponding value is greater than the value in the
local database, then the authentication clock of the
party is warped according to the procedures defined in
Section 5.3 of [3]. Regardless, A is recorded as the
clock synchronization knowledge for the corresponding
party.

So, if the column sweep returns information for party #4,
then party #4's authentication clock is advanced if
necessary, and the clock synchronization knowledge for
party #4 is recorded as acl #1.

5.2. Use of Clock Synchronization Knowledge

Whenever a response to an authenticated operation is not received,
the SNMP protocol engine may suspect that a clock synchronization
problem for the source party is the cause [3]. The SNMP protocol
engine may use different criteria when making this determination; for

example: on a retrieval operation, the operation might be retried
using an exponential back-off algorithm; in contrast, on a
modification operation, the operation would not be automatically
retried.

When clock mis-synchronization for a source party, S, is suspected,
if clock synchronization knowledge for S is present, then this
knowledge is used to perform steps 4-7 above, which should retrieve
the instances of the "partyAuthProtocol" and "partyAuthClock" objects
which correspond to S (and perhaps other parties as well). If
information on these objects cannot be determined, then S is marked
as no longer having clock synchronization knowledge. Otherwise, if
the value of the corresponding instance of "partyAuthClock" is
greater than the value in the local database, then the authentication
clock of the party is warped according to the procedures defined in
Section 5.3 of [3], and the original operation is retried, if
appropriate.

So, if traffic from party #4 times out, then a column sweep is
automatically initiated, using acl #1 (party #1, party #2, context
#1).

When clock mis-synchronization for a source party, S, is suspected,
and clock synchronization knowledge for S is not present, then the
full algorithm above can be used. In this case, if clock
synchronization knowledge for S can be determined, and as a result,
"partyAuthClock" value for S in the local database is warped
according to the procedures defined in Section 5.3 of [3], then the
original operation is retried, if appropriate.

5.3. Determination of Secret Update Knowledge

To determine maintenance knowledge for secret update:

(1) The SNMP protocol engine examines each active, non-local,
md5Auth party.

So, this would be party #3.

(2) For each such party, P, all access control entries having
that party as its aclTarget, and allowing the get-bulk
and set operations, are identified.

So, for party #3, this would be acl #2.

(3) For each such access control entry, A, at least one
active, non-local, md5Auth party, Q, must be present
which meets the following criteria:

- the transport domain and address of P and Q are
identical;

- an access control entry, B, exists having either: Q as
its aclTarget and a local party, R, as its aclSubject,
or, Q as its aclSubject and a local party, R, as its
aclTarget; and,

- no secret update knowledge is known for R.

So, for acl #2, party #3 is (redundantly) identified as
having the same transport domain and address as party #3,
and being present as the aclTarget in acl #2, which has
local party #4 as the aclSubject.

(4) Whenever such a party, Q, is present, then all instances
of the "partyAuthProtocol", "partyAuthClock", and
"partyAuthPrivate" objects are retrieved via the get-bulk
operator using the parties and context identified by the
access control entry, A.

So, party #3, party #4, and context #2 would be used to
sweep these three columns on the agent.

(5) Only those instances corresponding to parties in the
local database, which have no secret update knowledge,
and are md5Auth parties, are examined.

So, only instances corresponding to parties #3 and #4 are
examined.

(6) For each instance of "partyAuthProtocol", if the
corresponding value does not match the value in the local
database, then a configuration error is signalled, and
this party is marked as being unavailable for maintenance
knowledge.

So, we make sure that the manager and the agent agree
that both party #3 and #4 are md5Auth parties.

(7) For each instance of "partyAuthPrivate", if a
corresponding instance of "partyAuthClock" was also
returned, then A is recorded as the secret update
knowledge for this party.

So, if the column sweep returned information on party #3,
then the clock synchronization knowledge for party #3
would be recorded as acl #2. Further, if the column

sweep returned information on party #4, then the clock
synchronization knowledge for party #4 would be recorded
as acl #2.

5.4. Use of Secret Update Knowledge

Whenever the SNMP protocol engine determines that the authentication
clock of a party, S, is approaching an upper limit, and secret update
knowledge for S is present, then this knowledge is used to modify the
current secret of S and reset the authentication clock of S,
according to the procedures defined in Section 5.4 of [3].

So, whenever the SNMP protocol engine decides to update the secrets
for party #4, it can automatically use acl #2 (party #3, party #4,
context #2) for this purpose.

6. Other Kinds and Uses of Maintenance Knowledge

Readers should note that there are other kinds of maintenance
knowledge that an SNMPv2 manager could derive and use. In the
interests of brevity, one example is now considered: when an SNMPv2
manager first communicates with an agent, it may wish to synchronize
the maximum-message size values held by itself and the agent.

For those parties that execute at the agent, the manager retrieves
the corresponding instances of partyMaxMessageSize (preferrably using
authentication), and, if need be, adjusts the values held in the
manager's local party database. Thus, the maintenance knowledge to
be determined must allow for retrieval of partyMaxMessageSize.

For those parties that execute at the manager, the manager retrieves
the corresponding instances of partyMaxMessageSize (using
authentication), and, if need be, adjusts the values held in the
agent's local party database using the set operation. Thus, the
maintenance knowledge to be determined must allow both for retrieval
and modification of partyMaxMessageSize.

7. Security Considerations

Security issues are not discussed in this memo.

8. Acknowledgements

Jeffrey D. Case of SNMP Research and the University of Tennessee, and
Robert L. Stewart of Xyplex, both provided helpful comments on the
ideas contained in this document and the presentation of those ideas.

9. References

[1] Case, J., McCloghrie, K., Rose, M., and S. Waldbusser,
"Introduction to version 2 of the Internet-standard Network
Management Framework", RFC1441, SNMP Research, Inc., Hughes LAN
Systems, Dover Beach Consulting, Inc., Carnegie Mellon
University, April 1993.

[2] McCloghrie, K., and J. Galvin, "Party MIB for version 2 of the
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC1447, Hughes
LAN Systems, Trusted Information Systems, April 1993.

[3] Galvin, J., and K. McCloghrie, "Security Protocols for version 2
of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2)", RFC1446,
Trusted Information Systems, Hughes LAN Systems, April 1993.

10. Authors' Addresses

Keith McCloghrie
Hughes LAN Systems
1225 Charleston Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
US

Phone: +1 415 966 7934
EMail: kzm@hls.com

Marshall T. Rose
Dover Beach Consulting, Inc.
420 Whisman Court
Mountain View, CA 94043-2186
US

Phone: +1 415 968 1052
EMail: mrose@dbc.mtview.ca.us